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INTRODUCTION

It is not strange to think of atrocities when recalling historical events—whether one thinks of the
Armenian genocide, the Mongol invasions, European colonization, the Holocaust, or the
Inquisition. Rather than the exception, these brutal events are the rule; indeed, human history is a
saga of bloodthirsty monstrosities, a saga of power and death. But these historic, and therefore
indelible, “evils” seem so distant to us today that they are hardly intelligible, hardly real: how
can we make sense of genocide or slavery if not by resorting to manageable and rather
convenient explanations? They strike our generation as incidents which can be explained by the
“demonic” or “monstrous” nature of the involved. This is what we are taught: that evil is
something of the “deranged.” And if derangement does not suffice as an explanation, we will say
with some confidence that some evils are simply necessary or inevitable. Most people today are
quite persuaded that the barbarities of the past were the result of some kind of moral deficiency,
some special historical circumstance. Evil feels necessarily distant because we do not see
ourselves capable of it, it is produced always by the other, never by ourselves. This is not to say
that people today do not see the brewing of evil when it begins to boil, or that people are blind to
evil because they feel as though we have overcome it, what I am saying is that we are never
instruments or potential instruments of evil—but always at the periphery, at the margin, looking
at it with apprehension or heroic provocation, we are always responding, not acting, to threats.
We have come to think that we have seen it all, that we have seen religious militancy and cruelty
in its apogee, that we have witnessed the vicious and murderous products of racialism, tyranny,
and terrorism, that we have looked at what man is capable of and stared straight into the heart of
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pure evil…indeed, it is the feeling that at this point in history what is evil is obvious, and yet it is
this very idea that “evil” is obvious (i.e., easily detectable) which wreaks havoc. We know what
man is capable of, never what we are capable of—there’s the rub.
A youth reads the accessible literature on the Holocaust and can’t seem to understand the
proportions and terrible “logic” of this episode, and to make some kind of sense out of it,
baptizes Hitler a demon or “madman” and his followers mentally disturbed, racists, or slaves
who, out of fear for their lives, chose to not turn against the dominant ideology. This is why
Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil deeply startled the
world: her analyses showed that Eichmann was neither “demonic nor monstrous,” but rather
ordinary. This is the fear, the incontestable terror: that Eichmann was not demonic, but average,
not different from us in any obvious way. Eichmann’s evil—according to Arendt—is not one that
stems from a fanatical hatred or a vindictive nationalist attitude, but from “thoughtlessness”…
careless compliance with authority, a mere desire to advance his career. Eichmann’s case gave
birth to abundant questions about people’s participation (whether direct or indirect) in evil as a
result of thoughtless submission to authority.
Rather than asking why there is evil in the world, as philosophers and theologians
(among others) have done for centuries, this project will begin by asking a different set of
questions: What is the origin of the concept of “evil”? What purpose does evil serve in our lives?
Why do we let evil occur? And, if evil is not to be understood as a sign of madness or the
demonic, how should we understand it? Is evil necessary? And, if not, do we have a moral
responsibility to abolish it? We will be looking at Friedrich Nietzche’s On the Genealogy of
Morality, Ernest Becker’s Escape From Evil, Roy F. Baumeister’s Evil: Inside Human Violence
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and Cruelty, and David Pearce’s The Hedonistic Imperative and “Reprogramming Predators'' to
explore these questions. In considering the nature of evil from a linguistic/historical (Nietzsche),
psychological (Becker and Baumeister), and ethical (Pearce) standpoint, I will argue that evil and
power are inextricable, that evil is the result of weakness and fear—specifically fear of
death—rather than insanity or incomprehensible malice, and that the problem of evil is, broadly
speaking, the problem of suffering—psychological, physical, and spiritual suffering. Lastly, I
will make the case for the abolishment of suffering by leaning on the transhumanist
philosophical movement to argue that the elimination of psychological suffering through
designer drugs and genetic engineering is both sensible and tenable—justified, realistic. And that
the abolishment of suffering in the natural world by “re-programming” predatory species is an
urgent ethical issue, for we ought to take the suffering and paralyzing fear of non-human animals
as seriously as we take that of human beings. Moreover, I will be contending that this
abolishment of suffering is consistent with modern psychoanalytic theory, that is to say, that
leaning on technology to alter our biological constitution is a way out of a problem that
otherwise would persist indefinitely.
We will analyze Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality to look at “evil” through the
optic of power. We will investigate the emergence of the concepts of “good” and “evil” in
Nietzsche’s genealogical history of “slave morality,” and what that means to our discussion of
the nature of evil. Furthermore, we will explore the relationship between the need to discharge
power (of Nietzsche’s “Masters”) and “evil,” and why this need to affirm oneself is pivotal to
understanding the logic of wanting to inflict suffering to another man, and the place it held in
pre-moral society. Finally, we will analyze the relationship between power, evil, and weakness to

4
argue that the discharge of power was (and is) more of a defense mechanism against feelings of
inferiority or animality which these “types” of men, these “Masters” of Nietzsche, could not
bear.
Becker will show us that evil—from quotidian malice to the Nazi concentration
camps—springs from “...man’s natural and inevitable urge to deny mortality and achieve a heroic
self-image”; we will learn that evil, more often than not, is a response to evil rather than
unexplainable human cruelty. The human condition, as Becker sees it and as the most recent
psychoanalytic literature has concluded, is an enormous problem: one has an awareness of
oneself and one’s uniqueness, and of the fact of one’s mortality. This awareness of one’s
towering uniqueness in nature and one’s inevitable total annihilation creates a bundle of issues in
the human psyche; and it is these issues that are the root of most, if not all, of human
activity—and so to apprehend “evil” we must understand the agent of evil himself. It is this fear
of death, and all that it implies and produces, which causes hostility, cruelty, and wars. We will
see that culture (and ideology) is that constituent of society that is in charge of maintaining the
fear of death as invisible as possible—because it gives us a sense of order, meaning, and
purpose; and most importantly, because the protection of our beliefs is priority, for if the other is
right, we’re wrong, and if we’re wrong, we die. Through Becker, we will see that understanding
what makes a child bully another, or why we humiliate (casually, sarcastically…with a grin) each
other in the ways society deems admissible, or laugh at the expense of another, will help us
understand what is it that produces murders, genocides, and armed conflicts. Baumeister will
show us that evil is fundamentally in the eye of the beholder, that evil operates within the
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framework of victim and perpetrator, and that evil is often justified and rationalized in terms of
one’s own interests.
Finally, we will delve into David Pearce’s The Hedonistic Imperative and
“Reprogramming Predators” to look at the problem of evil as, fundamentally, the problem of
suffering. We will examine the evil of suffering from a contemporary and prescient
perspective—considering the ethics and methods of abolishing suffering (which is to say “evil”)
via the development of biotechnology. We will seriously consider the possibility of eradicating
human suffering through designer drugs and genetic engineering, and whether this is a sensible
aim or not; lastly, we will consider the prospect of removing the ceaseless suffering of the natural
world by “reprogramming” predators and prey—by designing an ecosystem that does not feature
organisms tearing each other apart. In the end, this project aims to probe into the problem of
“evil” from a multitude of disciplines, not only to look at “evil” from linguistic,
psychoanalytical, philosophical, and contemporary lenses, but to merge them, and arrive at an
integrated understanding of what we call “evil.”

Chapter 1—
The Birth of Evil: Power, Powerlessness, Guilt, and the “Bad Conscience”

It is sensible, necessary even, to initiate an investigation of evil with Nietzsche’s On the
Genealogy of Morality. In this text, Nietzsche not only undertakes the ambitious and overriding
task of disentangling the various strands (an amalgam of historical, psychological, etymological,
and psycholinguistic-al “strands”) that compose what we call “morality,” or to be more precise,
what we call “good” and “evil,” but Nietzsche asks us—forcibly and at times mockingly, with an
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unrivaled disarming tone—to look at good and evil through the framework of power. I will argue
that for Nietzsche the problem of “evil” (a problem which, following the Genealogy, poses itself
only in a certain type of individual) is really the problem of power: evil (the concept of evil, the
labeling of a person or thing as evil) is in point of fact a result of the antediluvian struggle for the
attainment and exercise of power. In other words, as long as there are powerful and powerless,
there will be evil—that is to say, an “evil” agent, a “victim,” an enmity, a “conflict.” I should
stress that the need to attain or exercise “power” will be a recurring psychological phenomenon
in our examination of evil, moreover an aid to understanding the mechanics of evil in any given
society.
In Nietzsche’s first essay in the Genealogy, “‘Good and Evil, ‘Good and Bad’,” we are
presented with an account of “Masters” and “Slaves” which designate two contrasting types of
men; leaning on these two modes of experiencing the world and oneself (the mode of the
“Master” and that of the “Slave”), Nietzsche lays the foundation of the history of morality, and
attempts to answer the unthought-of (unthought-of because of its seeming and deceptive
obviousness) question: under what conditions did man invent the values “good” and “evil”?
Simply put, how did the idea of “good” and “bad” arise, and how did they evolve into “good ”
and “evil” in the moral sense? As is customary in Nietzsche, his Genealogy is set in motion by
problematizing the predominant narrative of the hitherto “history of morality”—in this case, it is
the narrative put forward by the “English psychologists,” which is, according to Nietzsche, a
contaminated account of the true origins of “good” and “evil.” Nietzsche condemns, at the outset
of his book, the whacking misreading of history by the heretofore psychologists and philosophers
who have attempted to trace the roots of morality:
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The crass ineptitude of their genealogy of morals is immediately apparent when
the question arises of ascertaining the origin of the idea and judgment of “good.”
“Man had originally,” so speaks their decree, “praised and called ‘good’ altruistic
acts from the standpoint of those on whom they were conferred, that is, those to
whom they were useful; subsequently the origin of this praise was forgotten, and
altruistic acts, simply because, as a sheer matter of habit, they were praised as
good, came also to be felt as good—as though they contained in themselves some
intrinsic goodness.” (3)
Nietzsche sees this explanation as “coherent” and “psychologically tenable,” but the method of
explanation as tragically unhistorical: it is not the question that falters, it is the method, which
seeks and locates the roots of “good” and “bad” in the wrong place.
What Nietzsche maintains is that the root of the judgment “good” is not to be found
“among those to whom goodness was shown,” rather, it is to be found in the persons who, in
essence, felt themselves “good,” and hence defined and exemplified the “good”—it is “...the
aristocratic, the powerful, the high-stationed, the high-minded, who have felt that they
themselves were good, and that their actions were good, that is to say of the first order, in
contradistinction to all the low, the low-minded, the vulgar, and the plebeian” (3-4). The “good,”
then, were the vigorous, the high-octane, the affirmers and lovers of life; to be sure, they were
the ones who discharged their strength in varied and destructive ways, in establishing control and
order, in relishing life as they pleased, in exercising their freedom and “superiority”…not the
ones on which their strength was discharged. Nietzsche argues, and I think rightly, that at that
point in time “goodness” had nothing to do with utility, but everything to do with power. We
could say, then, that the “powerful” was synonymous with the “good,” and there is a
historico-etymological basis for this reasoning: the “...higher dominant race coming into
association with a meaner race, an ‘under race’, this is the origin of the antithesis of good and
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bad” (4). This is a peculiar proposition, by no means facile, and it rests first and foremost on the
understanding that it is the “Masters” who manage the specifics of language, or as Nietzsche
expounds, “The masters’ right of giving names go so far that it is permissible to look upon
language itself as the expression of the power of the masters: they say ‘this is that, and that,’ they
seal finally every object and every event with a sound, and thereby at the same time take
possession of it. It is because of this origin that the word “good” is far from...altruistic acts...in
accordance with the superstitious belief of these moral philosophers” (4). The origin of the word
“good” has to be necessarily traced back to the Masters’ mode of valuation, since it was the
Masters who initially composed language and infused it with meaning.
As is implied in the difference between what the Master calls the “good” and what the
Slave calls the “good” (which, as we will see, is secondary to an active, clearly delineated “evil,”
or, in other words, dependent on the Master), the Master and the Slave view and experience the
world and themselves in categorically dissimilar ways, meaning that the two modes of existence
cannot be reconciled. I call attention to this ontological polarity because to understand what I
will later refer to as the “dynamics of evil” (meaning the relationship between victim and
perpetrator), one should be clear on how these two ontological states operate: while one type of
man “predates,” that is to say expresses and exercises power, the other type is passive, and
though it seeks to attain power in some form, it is marked by an inability to frustrate the
“predator” from making of them their “prey.” The Slave revolt in morality is a result of this
inability to respond to the terrible dynamics of the Masters. Resentful and resolved, the Slaves
set out to demonize and bastardize the existing system of values (that of the Masters) in order to
obtain some measure of “goodness.”
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1. THE LANGUAGE OF WEAKNESS: ON THE BASTARDIZATION OF VALUES
“It is not surprising that the lambs should bear a grudge against the great birds of prey, but that is
no reason for blaming the great birds of prey for taking the little lambs.”
— Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals

Having spoiled the notion that the origin of the “good” is to be found in the altruistic, which is to
say the “useful” and “purposive” concerning [the interests of a community], Nietzsche goes on
to examine the root of the word “good,” rather than its concept—which has been mutilated,
disfigured, and re-shaped throughout the development of language and civilization. What he
found was that in most languages the concept “good” evolved from the same elemental idea:
“...everywhere ‘aristocrat,’ ‘noble’ (in the social sense), is the root idea, out of which have
necessarily developed ‘good’ in the sense of ‘with aristocratic soul,’ ‘noble’ in the sense of ‘with
a soul of high calibre,’ ‘with a privileged soul’ —a development which invariably runs parallel
with that other evolution by which ‘vulgar,’ ‘plebeian,’ ‘low,’ are made to change finally into
‘bad’ (6). This is hardly surprising when we take a look at anthropological literature: courage,
tenacity, willpower, strength, vigor and the like, were particularly prized attributes among early
organized society, and for good reason, since it was these attributes which assured the survival
and “progress” of a tribe or community—despite the violence, injustice, indifference, and
brutality that would necessarily have accompanied these values. Naturally, those of a more
“weak” constitution were not as esteemed or respected. I take the words “aristocrat” and “noble,”
which can indeed be confounding given the distinctly dull and pecuniary associations they have
today, to mean precisely this strength, this willpower, this vigor and energy that is forcefully
released into the world, more often than not at the expense of those who can’t help themselves.
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The slave revolt in morality initiates as a response to this powerlessness. Nietzsche
argues that the revolt rests on a principle of “ressentiment,” which, turned creative, sought to
establish a “proper outlet of action” through the process of bastardizing the inveterate values of
the ruling class. This bastardization, this reversal of values, served three main purposes: first to
disparage the values of the ruling class, to depict these values (and the individuals who hold
them) as “evil,” and finally (and most importantly) to re-define “goodness” in their image so as
to elevate themselves (17-30). As Nietzsche deridingly writes: “And the impotence which
requites not, is turned to ‘goodness,’ craven baseness to meekness, submission to those whom
one hates, to obedience… his forced necessity of waiting, gain here fine names, such as
‘patience,’ which is also called ‘virtue’; not being able to avenge one’s self… forgiveness…
They also talk of the ‘love of their enemies’ and sweat thereby” (30). By cleverly disguising their
weaknesses in “fine” language and a philosophy founded upon the merit (and eventual reward)
of possessing their impotent traits and values, the Slaves succeeded in affirming their own
“goodness,” but most importantly their own kind of strength—a strength based on meekness,
honesty, and patience.
The term “strength” here is not ill-suited, though it may appear contradictory: from the
perspective of the Master, these traits may well be symptoms of insufficiency; but from the point
of view of the Slave, these traits are the very things that earn them their sense of worthiness and
calibre, meaning that these weaknesses are in fact transfigured into strengths—to be capable of
renouncing sexual pleasure is a “strength,” to be capable of abstaining from taking revenge is a
“strength,” to be able to love one’s enemies despite their wickedness is a “strength,” to renounce
the acquisition of material goods and earthly pleasures is a “strength.” This transfiguration is the
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necessary base of the Slave’s “creative act,” is it the foundation of their narrative: the Slave is
unable to attain the sexual gratification he wishes due to his inadequacy, unable to avenge
himself due to his frailty, unable to hate due to his fear, and unable to attain the goods and
pleasures he desires due to his lack of vitality and command. It is here that the Slave’s creative
trick is at play, to claim not to want what they desperately want, and furthermore to demonize
what they want and exalt what they already have—which is a sort of “negative magic,” for
instead of congratulating themselves for what they do have, the Slaves congratulate themselves
for not having what the “evil one” has. The Slave engages in a continuous process of negation, of
denial of life and their nature (i.e., their instincts and natural desires), he remains in absolute
inertia (for their action is always a re-action), or as Nietzsche so aptly put it: “... it is good to do
nothing for which we are not strong enough” (29). This “negative magic” is not present in the
Master’s method of affirmation, for while the Master appoints himself “good” and hence affirms
himself and life, the Slave demonizes the Master and then goes on to find himself to be “good.”
In other words, the Slave finds himself to be “good” only secondarily, after having appointed the
other as “evil.” The point that Nietzsche is trying to make here is that while power affirms,
powerlessness negates—while the values of the Master depend only upon himself, the values of
the Slave are always in relation to the “evil one” (21-29).
Nietzsche concludes that the conflict between the two opposing values (“good and bad,”
“good and evil”) reached its culmination, and that Slave morality has turned out to be
triumphant: it has now become the universal morality, indeed, “...there are not wanting places
where the fortune of the fight is still indecisive” (35). The meaning of this is straightforward:
most if not all civilized societies have adopted the kind of values that perpetuate weakness of
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spirit and promote unabated repression of one’s animalistic impulses and instincts—the result of
this is “a smaller, almost ridiculous type, a herd animal, something eager to please, sickly, and
mediocre” (Beyond Good and Evil 62). One of the prices that civilized society had to pay for
adopting Slave morality and for turning against the instincts of life is, as we will shortly see, is
the choking…merciless lacerations by the hands of our “bad conscience”; indeed, the
interminable justifying and rationalizing of our actions to avoid the mutilations of guilt, of the
terrible feeling that we ought not to have done that, the feeling that we are “bad” (i.e., inhuman,
fiendish, callous) when our instincts surface, because we are ashamed of our instincts. And,
ashamed of our instincts, the cruel…the beast within us, labors to eat us alive in cold blood.

2. ONTOLOGICAL “GUILT”: ON THE FUNCTION AND MEANING OF “BAD CONSCIENCE”

“Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa.”

“In the religious myths, the creative will appears personified in God, and man already feels
himself guilty when he assumes himself to be like God, that is, to ascribe this will to himself.”
— Otto Rank, Truth and Reality
Nietzsche begins his second essay with a bold, perplexing statement: “The breeding of an
animal that can promise—is not this just that very paradox of a task which nature has set itself in
regard to man? Is not this the very problem of man? (40). For Nietzsche, this capacity to make
promises, this ability to say “I will do this” or “I will not do that,” is the real problem with which
we are born—suggesting thus that promise-making is a distinctive human faculty. The
foundation of promises is memory, for to fulfill a promise one must remember to do what one
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said one would—and to do it. Promise-making is essentially a technology that allows one to
capture a will and freeze it through language. Indeed, it is to organize the future as befits a past
will. The opposing force, argues Nietzsche, is that of forgetfulness (40); this force is of the
highest order, for we would collapse under the weight of our memories if we were to remember
every single thing that ever entered our awareness:
The temporary shutting of the doors and windows of consciousness, the relief
from the clamant alarums and excursions, with which our subconscious world of
servant organs works in mutual co-operation and antagonism; a little quietude, a
little tabula rasa of the consciousness, so as to make room again for the new, and
above all for the more noble functions and functionaries, room for government,
foresight, predetermination… this is the utility, as I have said, of the active
forgetfulness, which is a very sentinel and nurse of psychic order… and this
shows at once why it is that there can exist no happiness, no gladness, no hope, no
pride, no real present, without forgetfulness. (40-41)
The problem with promises is that they belie forgetting, they have an “active refusal to get rid of
it, a continuing and a wish to continue what has once been willed, an actual memory of the will;
so that between the original ‘I will,’ ‘I shall do,” and the actual discharge of the will...we can
easily interpose a world of strange phenomena, circumstances…without the snapping of this long
chain of the will” (41). Promises, thus, come with the perilous task of ordaining the future in
advance, of reckoning, of anticipating and calculating, hence making us regular...constant: this is
ultimately the origin of responsibility. For Nietzsche, the birth of responsibility took place when
man made a promise, for to make a promise is to sign a contract that requires the impossible,
namely, calculation of the future and regularity of the self.
Guilt is born from the inability to fulfill a promise, to owe to one’s responsibility; pride,
on the other hand, is born from the realization of promises, from their execution—and it is the
“...sovereign individual, that resembles only himself, that has got loose from the morality of
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custom, the autonomous ‘supermoral’ individual,” who can savor the privilege of responsibility
and pride, which take in him the form of his “conscience” (43). Nietzsche examines the nature of
promises and guilt to cook, so to speak, his overriding claim that promises are debts: when one
makes a promise one makes a pact, and it is the breaking of this pact that produces guilt. To
finance this point Nietzsche reminds us that the German word “Schuld” (guilt) is etymologically
linked to “Schulden” (debt): he who is in debt is guilty (47). It is evident in this essay that we are
no longer dealing with a genealogy of morality, but with a genealogy of guilt—and of what
Nietzsche sees as the most hazardous and tragic of man’s sicknesses, the “bad conscience.” The
“bad conscience” is the result of the excessive repression of the post-slave revolt period. This
repression of our animal instincts and drives becomes integral to our psychological functioning:
in order to feel "clean," "good," unpolluted by "evil," “sane” even... it is necessary to maintain
repressed desires and thoughts under constant surveillance—the psychological mechanism
tasked with keeping one in “check” is the “bad conscience,” which tortures and evaluates man
based on his deviations from social norm. What we will see is that this repression has monstrous
consequences: the fact that natural instincts and drives are demonized and repressed does not
mean these instincts and drives are disposed of. The personal price one has to pay to be “good”
(in the slavish sense) is to perpetually suffer by the “bad conscience.” The collective price to be
paid is much less obvious, but it should not astonish the reader: what better way to feel oneself
“good” than to conceive of the other as “evil”? What happens is that evil (as it is ordinarily
understood today) ends up being done as a response to evil (in the eyes of the slavishly “good”).
A consideration of guilt, the “bad conscience,” and punishment (which is directly connected to
the relationship between power and powerlessness, for as we will see, punishment is the venting
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of power upon the powerless) is imperative to understanding evil today, since all three of these
mechanisms are embedded in the psychological composition of man (post-Christianity).
Now, having established that man’s conscience stems from this “...proud knowledge of
the extraordinary privilege of responsibility,” Nietzsche goes on to explain how certain memories
(which are the basis of his conscience) are to be implanted in him (44). To be “conscious” is an
extension of consciousness, an aberration, which now does not assess the world only, but
also—and obsessively—one’s own self: it is to be self-conscious, that is, to be cruelly aware of
oneself, of one’s display, of one’s actions and their respective consequences—it is thus to be
socialized, domesticated. To implant a memory in man, to make an impression in him which is
both enduring and hypnotic, it is necessary to employ violence, cruelty, inclemency...and the
most effective mnemonic device in history has been the administration of suffering: “When man
thinks it necessary to make for himself a memory, he never accomplishes it without blood,
tortures and sacrifice” (45). The logic being that “...only that which never stops hurting remains
in his memory” (45). Leaning on Germany’s history to validate this point, Nietzsche reminds us
of the old German punishment exhibitions of the not-so-distant past:
These Germans employed terrible means to make for themselves a memory, to
enable them to master their rooted plebeian instincts and the brutal crudity of
those instincts: think of the old German punishments, for instance, stoning…
dart-throwing, tearing, or trampling horses... boiling the criminal in oil or wine
(still prevalent in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries), the highly popular
flaying (‘slicing into strips’), cutting the flesh out of the breast… It was with the
help of such images and precedents that man eventually kept in his memory five
or six ‘I will nots' with regard to which he had already given his promise, so as to
be able to enjoy the advantages of society. (47)
To be able to participate in organized society, to reap the benefits of society, the individual must
refrain from breaking his “promise,” which is the fundamental promise, the promise we may
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refer to as his contract with society—if he wishes to be a member of society, he must follow its
rules and customs, must obey its mandates, if he is to avoid being severely punished or cast out.
With the help of these picturesque and brutal displays, a cluster of memories are implanted in
man which reserve the loftiest vibrancy, and he will remember a selection of “I will nots,” and
will undergo a stringent and “tragic” transformation: from instinct-driven, as if “...carried by the
water,” to calculative... self-conscious, constant, as though he were no more than a burden (76).
The notion that a man deserves punishment because he might have acted otherwise hasn’t
yet surfaced; hence, it was not because his undertaking was “morally reprehensible,” and
furthermore that it was intentional, that he was subjected to torture; rather, he was punished as a
way of repayment. One punishes, out of anger, he who produced the anger, so as to ameliorate
one’s vexation, or as Nietzsche so aptly put it: “...punishment was inflicted in those days for the
same reason that parents punish their children…out of anger at an injury that they have suffered,
an anger which vents itself mechanically on the author of the injury—but this anger is kept in
bounds and modified through the idea that every injury has somewhere or other its equivalent
price” (48). In other words, punishment was administered for the sole pleasure that it granted its
manager, not because the other party “ought to have done differently” and should be taught a
“lesson.” This “equivalent price” means a “compensation,” a re-payment, founded on a
deep-seated animal delight, the fulfillment of being able to discharge one’s anger upon he who
failed us, the unrivaled satisfaction of releasing one’s power on the abjectly powerless: and the
more “unfavorable” one’s position is within the social strata, the more satisfaction one will attain
from delivering suffering, for it allows one to participate in the characteristic delights of the
Master (50). Nietzsche maintains that the “...infliction of suffering produces the highest degree of
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happiness,” and it is at this point that most of his readers become wary of the veracity of his
turbulent claims; to be sure, one would be right in distrusting the contention that the
administration of suffering generates happiness of the first order, since Nietzsche barely finances
this idea—it feels insensitive, preposterous even, to grant Nietzsche this particular point, and
since we do not need to accept this idea that suffering produces an unequaled excitement and
happiness to follow or validate his other points, we don’t. I maintain that this idea is of the
utmost importance in the genealogy of guilt, because what the infliction of pain bestows on an
individual is an unshakable...relentless sense of power, of being powerful, of feeling—for a few
little moments—like a small god, who has a man before him...at his mercy. Modern
psychoanalytic theory has taught us that what we call “happiness” is a loose state in which we
feel secure in our flesh, in which our self-esteem grants us the feeling of being truly well,
valuable to creation; it is also a state in which an impenetrable, resolute feeling of immunity from
the perils of existence allows us to move about freely and actively. To the extent that we
administer pain, we feel well, alive, powerful, above suffering itself. At any rate, this is hardly
graspable without the necessary insights that lead to this fundamental idea, but suffice it to say
that it will be covered profusely in Chapter 2, where we will examine Roy F. Baumeister’s Evil:
Inside Human Violence and Cruelty and Ernest Becker’s Escape From Evil.
This model of punishment we could refer to as the Masters’ Model, a model which
comprises no moral assessment, and that primarily revolves around the idea that every injury can
be paid back—and, as we’ve already said, it is through the enjoyment of administering pain to
the debtor that the creditor gets his equivalent. It was a legitimate method of repayment (we may
refer to it as a form of rudimentary economics): the enjoyment of torturing the debtor was
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sufficient to satisfy whatever loss the creditor may have experienced. The creditor did not
consider the debtor’s payment of flesh “inferior” to the original, nor did he deem the debtor
“evil,” it was a fair and valid exchange.
To understand Nietzsche’s loathing of guilt and the “bad conscience,” we have to
understand his loathing of nihilism—which he believed to be the result of the triumph of Slave
morality. For Nietzsche, nihilism is the ultimate evil because it reduces the magnificence of life
to meaninglessness, tedium, and pessimism: it negates life absolutely, and the instincts along
with the drives are invalidated, resulting in a thwarted...backward existence. Instead of thriving
on the savoring and expansion of life, the nihilist thrives on the disintegration of life and of
himself, on the fracturing of his very desires and life forces.

3. ON THE POWERLESSNESS OF POWER: WILL-TO-POWER AS NIHILISM
“All power is in essence power to deny mortality. Either that or it is not real power at all, not
ultimate power, not the power that mankind is really obsessed with. Power means power to
increase oneself, to change one's natural situation from one of smallness, helplessness, finitude,
to one of bigness, control, durability, importance.”
— Ernest Becker, Escape From Evil
Nietzsche’s elucidation of the motivations of the “Master” and the “Slave” is infused with
his often forceful...pictorial and severe psychological insights. Yet, though the motives of the
Slave are bared with psychoanalytic insights very much ahead of his time (the notion of
“ressentiment” and the Slave’s “reversal” of values to fit their vital needs), the motives of the
Masters are scarcely dealt with, and are rather simplified (or should I say reduced) to the
“healthy” appetite and will of the Masters—their life-affirming virtues, their potent yearning for
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self-expansion, their need to discharge their latent power and superiority. At any rate, it should
be pointed out that the “goodness” with which the aristocrats credit themselves is of a
psychological nature, meaning that they “feel themselves to be beings of a higher order than
their fellows,” of course this is the same with the “goodness” of the Slave (7). To feel as though
one is of a higher order, a higher species even, and then to go on to define oneself as “good” and
those who are unlike oneself as “bad” is critical here: Nietzsche understood perfectly well that
the masses of “weak” constitution which did not have neither the vigor nor the calibre to attain
the feelings of superiority which they naturally desired (this we will get into more detail when
we examine Becker’s Escape From Evil), had to necessarily demonize the humanity of the
powerful so as to revere themselves for being what they are, that is, meek and passive, as
opposed to assertive and overbearing; what Nietzsche did not seem to consider was that the
aristocratic passion and obsession with power results from the same basic need for superiority.
What this means is that the unabating discharge of power of the aristocrats was not and is not a
consequence of Nietzsche’s romanticized “love” and “affirmation” of life, but an attempt to raise
themselves from worm status to that of a god in order to feel secure in the threatening and
annihilating world in which they found themselves—but more importantly, secure even in the
face of death, which they played at delivering. It is sensible to remember here Nietzsche’s
contention that the infliction of suffering produces great happiness, and though we will take this
idea further in our Becker chapter, it is worth laying its basic foundation here. Nietzsche does not
give us much as to why it is that the administration of suffering satisfies deeply the perpetrator;
rather, the idea emerges and develops in the Genealogy without base: it is a remarkable and
baleful observation about the nature of the human animal—that the sight of another animal
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suffering by our own hands generates an inordinate measure of satisfaction. Moreover, one
should note that the administration of suffering was “...all the more appreciated the greater the
paradox created by the rank and social status of the creditor”; this detail should not be hastily set
aside, since it is the cornerstone of Nietzsche’s observation, and the nub of our analysis (51).
This conception is hardly intelligible, if not appalling, and to cut through the heart of it we need
to be clear on what it is that man gets out of the sight of suffering—it is certainly true that the
administration of suffering is a potent mnemonic, and it adequately explains why after the
post-slave revolt public punishments and executions were so habitual: their function was both to
accelerate socialization and to provide some sort of delight...a delight rooted in feeling above the
victim, in loathing the victim, in seeing him suffer while we watch, we the good ones.
One should also be aware that Nietzsche claimed, in his 1873 essay “On Truth and Lies
in a Nonmoral Sense,” that truths are nothing more than illusions: “Truths are illusions which
we have forgotten are illusions — they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been
drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as
metal and no longer as coins” (117). This is relevant because Nietzsche was outspoken about the
idea that the search for “truth” is motivated by an unconscious desire for symbolic security—at
the outset of Beyond Good and Evil he fervently attacks the search for “truth” of the philosophers
who preceded him, condemning them of proving no more than their prejudices and evidencing
no more than their personalities. Applying this understanding of “truth” to the Genealogy is not a
difficult task, so it stands to reason that we doubt Nietzsche’s claim that the aristocrats
discharged power as it grew within them in an act of affirmation. It can be argued, I think rightly,
that the discharge of power was more of a tactic, a defense mechanism, against feelings of
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inferiority or animality which these “types” of men could not bear—if this reading is correct, it
problematizes Nietzsche’s vision of ridding mankind from a nihilistic future, for if the
will-to-power of the aristocrat is little more than a mere defense against his meaninglessness and
defenselessness (by playing at beings gods and the “chosen” ones by nature) then this is the most
absolute form of nihilism: a nihilism that refuses to accept what man is by playing at being what
man is not—we should take man for what he is, not for what he pretends to be, or for what he
claims to be. While the masses of weak men thought themselves to be the “chosen” ones by God,
the aristocrats imagined themselves to be chosen by nature—to finance this point we could look
back at Nietzsche’s etymological analysis, how in the various languages the meaning of the
“good” was in direct psycho-linguistic relation to “the possessors,” “the lords,” “the godlike,”
“the man of godlike race” (8-10). This interrelation between the “good” and “the godlike” should
not be understood casually, it expresses the depth of the aristocrat’s desire to elevate themselves,
to be more than animal, more than beast... Furthermore, Nietzsche claims that the Master
"affirms" life, "celebrates" life, but given the Master's ruthlessness and brutality, it is more
reasonable to think that the Master energetically denies it—they might indeed affirm their own
lives, yet at the expense of the lives of others, which can be read (through a psycho-analytical
perspective) as a form of weakness, for affirming one's life by diminishing and torturing (recall
here the many meanings of "bad" at the start of our discussion, and the historical barbarism of
Nietzsche's so-called Masters), in the sundry ways known by man, those unlike oneself is akin to
the Slave's reversal of values—the Master needs the Slave to inflate his egoism and earn his
feelings of superiority, this is evident in Nietzsche's derisive language to describe the Slave as
fundamentally inferior. The “inferiority” of the Slave does give credit and value to the Master,
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the Master needs the Slave just as the Slave needs the Master in order to demonize him and
affirm his goodness and consequently his superiority.

Chapter 2—
The Mechanics of Evil, Immortality, and the Human Condition
“Cruelty can arise from the aesthetic outrage we sometimes feel in the presence of strange
individuals who seem to be making out all right. . . Have they found some secret passage to
eternal life? It can’t be. If those weird individuals with beards and funny hats are acceptable, then
what about my claim to superiority? Can someone like that be my equal in God’s eyes? Does he,
that one, dare hope to live forever too — and perhaps crowd me out? I don’t like it. All I know
is, if he’s right I’m wrong. So different and funny-looking. I think he’s trying to fool the gods
with his sly ways. Let’s show him up. He’s not very strong. For a start, see what he’ll do when I
poke him."
― Ernest Becker, Escape from Evil

1. VICTIMS OF EVIL, PERPETRATORS OF EVIL: A PHENOMENOLOGY
Baumeister opens his examination of evil by problematizing the popular perception of evil
(which he refers to as the myth of pure evil) and its reality. Baumeister argues that evil, as
comfortable as it is for us to think, is not black and white—perpetrators of evil do not usually see
their actions as “evil,” it is the victims of evil who expose the “evil.” It is important to note that
Baumeister is not merely proposing that evil is “relative,” that is to say, he is not making an
ethical statement, but rather arguing that in the minds of people, evil is intricately coiled by a
number of variables. Baumeister writes: “Evil usually enters the world unrecognized by the
people who open the door and let it in. Most people who perpetrate evil do not see what they are
doing as evil. Evil exists primarily in the eye of the beholder, especially in the eye of the victim”
(1); if “evil,” as a general rule, is not recognized by the perpetrators, then is evil a “victim’s
question”? The perpetrators are not writing dissertations trying to understand their “evil” acts; it
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is the victims who are mystified and perturbed, and can’t seem to wrap their head around how
anybody could do such a thing, how anybody could be so cruel and blind to the pain they breed.
What this means is that one can do evil with the best of intentions, convinced that one is doing
right. There is no real need to exemplify this, it is enough to consider the many cases in which
one person is perfectly convinced that the other treats them unjustly, while the other person is
just as convinced that they are the ones being treated unfairly. Both persons are likely to have the
same fundamental beliefs about “evil,” and yet, their roles in the event (of either victim or
perpetrator) dictate their experience.
By and large, we look at evil from the victim’s perspective, we look at the painful and
sometimes devastating results of the perpetrator’s actions. We are curious and sympathetic, and
more often than not, utterly and distressingly confused. As Baumeister explains, “The reliance on
judgments by others is essential. Indeed, if we limited our examination of evil to acts that
perpetrators themselves acknowledged as evil, there would be hardly any such acts to examine”
(6). It is only natural to assume that perpetrators “know” that they are doing evil, that they enjoy
committing their deplorable acts, that they extract great pleasure from causing pain and panic. Of
course, this is true in some cases, but as a rule, this notion that perpetrators are aware that they’re
doing evil, and enjoy the pain they cause, is a fallacy. This is what Baumeister aptly calls “the
myth of pure evil”: the notion that perpetrators are “sadistic,” and intentionally harm other
people, while the victims are innocent and undeserving of their fate. These ideas of “wicked,
malicious, sadistic perpetrators inflicting senseless harm on innocent, well-meaning victims” are
repeatedly reinforced in film, literature, news broadcast, and other mediums to the point of
defining the nature and mechanics of human evil (17). What we will learn is that evil is really “in
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the eye of the beholder,” and to understand this—argues Baumeister—we must realize that we
ourselves are capable, and possibly responsible, of many evils.
When we think of historico-political evil we tend to look back at the Nazis; we think of
the concentration camps, of the persecution, the terror, and the senselessness of death. The Nazis,
as Baumeister writes, have “replaced the red-skinned, pointy-tailed Satan as the prototype of
evil” (34). To apprehend how Germany became a murderous totalitarian state we must scrutinize
Germany’s psychic landscape at the time. It is important to understand that the Nazis were
“idealists and utopians," and so whatever evils they might have committed were guided by a
“strong utopian vision” (34). What this reveals is self-evident: that regardless of the atrocities the
Nazis so meticulously executed, in their eyes, they were doing a great good. It is critical to bear
in mind that Baumeister is not trying to “make apologies or offer excuses for people who commit
terrible actions''; instead, he maintains that to understand evil one must understand “the excuses,
rationalizations, minimizations, and ambiguities that mark [the perpetrators] state of mind” (20).
Note that Baumeister is not saying that to “know” that something is evil one must understand the
“excuses'' and “rationalizations'' of the perpetrators; rather, he observes that in order to
understand, to decipher how so much evil can be allowed to enter the world, we must pay
attention to what the people that let it in are thinking, what are the “rationalizations'' and
“minimizations'' that mark their patterns of thought. How can we hope to understand or to some
degree minimize evil if we brush aside the processes of thought that precede it? In some cases,
the evil is obvious (e.g., the Holocaust), what’s not so obvious is how millions of people who are
neither better nor worst than us could allow such evil to take place. Less obvious is how a mere
man, composed of the very things we are all composed of, can guiltlessly lead murderous armies
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to “exterminate” masses of innocent people—nay, can believe he has the right to do so.
Baumeister writes:
They wanted to build a perfect society. In order to transform an overpopulated
country into a Jeffersonian rural democracy (their idea of a perfect society) they
required more land. They saw some very suitable land to the east. Unfortunately
(in their view), that land was occupied by all those Polish people. Those people
were in the way, and the logical plan was to move them out somehow.
Concentration camps were initially for relocating people, not killing them. The
systematic killings seem to have started only after alternative options for
relocation became impractical … Their argument was along these lines: “Look,
the Americans have applied modern ideas to build a better society, and if we do
not do the same we will be left behind as a foolish, doddering, obsolete form of
society. Instead, we must rush to the forefront of historical and scientific progress.
We must do as well as the Americans, and even better. (34-35; italics mine)
It is not simply that the Germans wanted power, that they wanted to surpass other countries by
any means necessary, it is—as we will viscerally understand through Becker—that they wanted
to build a world that was not subject to annihilation, a special world, greater than any other and
that thus deserved immortality; a world where the people felt like they were at the cutting edge
of existence, on its summit, and no thing or enemy could ever be a threat...the world was
supposed to be theirs. Becker will show us that the public’s patriotic conviction and support is
indeed a logical and expected response from the people of a nation in such circumstances, given
that ultimately what the human animal seeks is to avoid the greatest of all evils: death (both
literal and symbolic). We see this kind of utopian conviction even today, with North Korea
regarding itself as the greatest nation, one that actively avoids being contaminated by foreigners.
I remarked earlier that many historical evils seem to us today distant and inscrutable...hardly real,
and North Korea is a paragon of this sentiment—few people are viscerally aware of the alarming
perversity of North Korea, a country that seems to have been taken out of a dystopian sci-fi novel
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in which real people live and real people are trapped. It is not an exaggeration to say that North
Korea is a “different world,” and no foreigner can claim to understand the kind of security,
direction, and sense of “meaning” that it offers its people.
Today, as half the world is suddenly dealing with a virus (COVID-19) that is both alien
and lethal, the coliseum of protection and invulnerability that the people have built, thanks to the
innovations of science and medicine, and the transcending powers of culture, is crumbling down
in torrents. The countries who thought themselves to be immune to the “problems of the other”
are now suffering the consequences of maintaining the self-esteem of their nation even in the
face of death. In the US, President Donald Trump continues to spout inaccurate information
about this deadly virus to soothe the public’s growing fear: that it is a form of “flu” (reminding
us of something familiar and that we have survived before), that it is the “Chinese virus”
(suggesting that it is the problem of the Chinese and not ours, that we should be fine because
we’re in America, not China), that he has it “under control.” I had seen and heard dozens of
people, days before the first confirmed case in the US was announced, mocking the situation in
China, content because they were safe and sound, unshakably convinced that if the virus were to
come to the US we would promptly find a cure and “solve it.” One particular comment from a
friend back home struck me, I had asked her if she feared that the virus will come to the US, and
she replied, grinning: “That’s in China, we’re in the US!” This false sense of security is
necessary to make the fear of death invisible to the public, to make people feel like they’re
immune to unexpected threats because they are under a caring system that looks after them, this
is the transcending magic of culture. These two examples have nothing to do with evil, but with
what the people of a country psychologically need (again, this is something that we will dive into
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more deeply with Becker), how the psychic landscape of a given place is defined and treated. If
these psychological needs are not met, we can be sure that evil will emerge as a consequence. As
soon as people were told that COVID-19 originated in China, cases of hostility toward Asians
could be witnessed almost instantly—this is hardly surprising, considering that people want to
feel like they’re on the right side of the equation.
As Baumeister so well put it, “A full appreciation of the German mental state must also
incorporate the shock of the war itself [WW1], win or lose, which is now rather difficult for
people to imagine” (36); at the time, the Germans felt like they were being left behind, that the
other countries were rushing past them and laughing at them, that they were being mocked by
greater powers—that, in a quite literal but symbolic sense, they were approaching their death.
Baumeister brings up the idea of “righting past wrongs” as a vital element of evil in the world,
and this is exactly how one of the dominant Nazi perspectives operated:
Many Nazis regarded their actions as getting even for past wrongs and injustices.
In their view, they had been mistreated and they were setting things right … They
felt their country deserved a leading position in Europe, but instead it had been
treated with disrespect; conspired against by the older powers; tricked into losing
the war; and then utterly exploited, humiliated, emasculated, and looted by the
outrageous Versailles treaty and postwar settlements. It defied their common
sense to see how their proud and mighty country had become a military,
economic, and political basket case. The Jews had undermined the war effort and
stabbed their country in the back (or so many Germans came to believe), and the
Allied enemy powers, unable to win on the battlefield, had cheated and then
exploited Germany … The winners concluded that there must be no more wars.
The losers concluded that there had to be another war to set things right: So much
sacrifice could not be allowed to be in vain. (36-37)
As difficult as it is for us to imagine today, this was the German reality at the time. The point that
Baumeister is trying to make is that while almost everyone would agree that Hitler’s Germany
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was a fountain of evil, to them (the perpetrators) they were responding to evil—they were not
sadistically murdering the Jews out of fierce bigotry, but trying to put their country back on its
feet. The people were not “supporting” the bloodbath of Jews in the mythological sense of evil;
rather, they saw it as “necessary.” To them, they were “unfortunate by-products of something that
had had much to recommend it. The country had really gotten back on its feet, and there was a
strong public morality with ‘family values’ heavily and consensually emphasized. After collapse
and depression, the return to normality seemed a miracle” (38).
Another historico-political instance that shows that evil is “in the eye of the beholder” is
the Colombian conflict in the 1980s. The narco emerges as a great Robinhood, as a
revolutionary, entering the sacred world of the rich and serving as an example of opposition: to
invade the place of the rich and give back to the poor. While the Colombian drug cartels bought
the police and most politicians at the time, killed staggering numbers of people and designed
loops of human trafficking, many communities in Colombia (who received financial help from
these criminals) venerated these drug lords (amongst them the notable Pablo Escobar) and saw
them as heroes who turned against a system that methodically oppressed their communities.
Again, the idea of “righting past wrongs” is evident. Baumeister gives us the case of a gang of
black teenagers who murdered a white man because they felt he disrespected their people and
historically humiliated their kind, in an interview one of the boys had said, “Fucking up white
boys like that made us feel good inside,” adding that as they walked away they laughed and
boasted about who had done the most damage (24). What all of these examples demonstrate is
that violence ensues when “people feel that their favorable views of themselves are threatened or
disputed by others,” and this is the foundation of Becker’s work: the individual’s need for high
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self-esteem, for ego-inflation, for a powerful feeling of self-worth, for a ticket to immortality.
This is why the bully diminishes the other, and why violent husbands commit heinous crimes
when they feel their “manhood” is under attack, and why we would laugh at the expense of
another. Self-esteem, we will see, is the key to unravel the logic and promise of evil. As
Baumeister rightly observes: “You do not have to give people reasons to be violent, because they
already have plenty of reasons. All you have to do is take away their reasons to restrain
themselves. Even a small weakening of self-control might be enough to produce a rise in
violence. Evil is always ready and waiting to burst into the world” (14).
2. THE HUMAN CONDITION, DEATH, AND HEROISM
Before we dive into Becker’s Escape From Evil, we must first discuss his earlier work, The
Denial of Death, to lay bare his philosophy. Becker maintains, in his Escape From Evil, that
human evil stems from “man’s natural and inevitable urge to deny mortality and achieve a heroic
self-image.” Since Escape From Evil is the continuation of The Denial of Death, we must first
understand why death is such a monumental problem for the human animal. If I have succeeded
in this section of the paper, we should have no trouble understanding what is it that the school
bully gets out of harassing others, or what does a gang member get by killing an enemy gang
member, or what does a child get out of tearing apart a toy that belongs to his brother. All of
these “evil” acts have the same underlying basis: self-inflation, importance capital, the
undermining of the other for the aggrandizement of ourselves.
Becker argues, in his The Denial of Death, that the totality of modern psychoanalytic
theory boils down to one fundamental principle, that “of all the things that move man, one of the
principal ones is his terror of death” (11). The question of the “nature” or “essence” of man is a
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misleading question, for what makes the human animal so special, declares Becker, is not his
“essence” but his condition:
...the essence of man is really his paradoxical nature, the fact that he is half
animal and half symbolic… He is a symbolic self, a creature with a name, a life
history. He is a creator with a mind that soars out to speculate about atoms and
infinity, who can place himself imaginatively at a point in space and contemplate
bemusedly his own planet. This immense expansion, this dexterity, this
ethereality, this self-consciousness gives to man literally the status of a small god
in nature… Yet, at the same time, man is a worm and food for worms. (26)
Man is not a concrete animal, he is “neither angel nor beast,” he is ambiguous.
Self-consciousness, which has given man the ability to reflect upon his condition and realize his
uniqueness, has also given him the consciousness of personal death, the ability to foresee his
own extinction—to conceive of his own inevitable and total perishment. The situation in which
man finds himself is a scandal: he is thrown into an unintelligible existence, amid the terrifying
vastness of the universe, to come of age, develop an identity, have deep inner feelings and
yearnings, and all to be wiped off the face of the earth. What modern psychology has come to
understand, according to Becker, is that “everything that man does in his symbolic world is an
attempt to deny and overcome his grotesque fate” (27); this “symbolic world” is the world of
culture, a world in which everything is seemingly figured out, in which we can act out different
roles and derive our sense of cosmic significance in a straightforward way. The world is built in
such a way that one can spend an entire lifetime without ever truly believing in one’s own death,
without ever being convinced or viscerally aware that when the lights are out, they are out
permanently. Naturally, says Becker, we can’t handle a reality like this, we can’t just accept that
who we are, or who we think we are, is fundamentally a lie that we have carefully constructed to
mask the total meaninglessness of our lives. To eliminate the threat of insignificance, we give
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our lives meaning, we strive for great feats and try to stick out in subtle ways—how can our lives
be so meaningless when we are so special? It delights us to feel better, smarter, or more talented
than others because it reinforces our illusions of primacy, of cosmic value. Sibling rivalry is a
paragon of this idea:
In childhood we see the struggle for self-esteem at its least disguised. His whole
organism shouts the claim of his natural narcissism … We like to speak casually
about “sibling rivalry,” as though it were some kind of by-product of growing up,
a bit of competitiveness and selfishness of children who have been spoiled, who
haven’t yet grown into a generous social nature. But it is too all-absorbing and
relentless to be an aberration, it expresses the heart of the creature: the desire to
stand out, to be the one creation. When you combine natural narcissism with the
basic need for self-esteem, you create a creature who has to feel himself an object
of primary value … the child cannot allow himself to be second best or devalued,
much less left out. “You gave him the biggest piece of candy!” You gave him
more juice!” “Here’s a little more, then.” “Now she’s got more juice than me!”
“You let her light the fire in the fireplace and not me.” “Okay, you light a piece of
paper.” “But this piece of paper is smaller than the one she lit.” And so on and on.
An animal who gets his feeling of worth symbolically has to minutely compare
himself to those around him, to make sure he doesn’t come off second-best.” (3-4)
It should not be too difficult for us to see how this natural narcissism manifests itself in adults—
we see it in the parents who brag about how special or talented their children are; we see it in the
gossiping, in the magical satisfaction of feeling that we’re better. “My daughter always gets the
highest grades in her math program!” “How did you do on the test? I only managed to get a 92,
what was your score?” Becker takes the idea that the human animal needs to feel himself an
“object of primary value” and develops it further, introducing the notion that “heroism” is our
chief psychological motive: “...human heroics is a blind drivenness that burns people up; in
passionate people, a screaming for glory … In the more passive masses of mediocre men it is
disguised as they humbly and complainingly follow out the roles that society provides for their
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heroics … wearing the standard uniforms—but allowing themselves to stick out, ever so little
and so safely, with a little ribbon or a red boutonniere, but not with head and shoulders” (6). It is
within this problem of “heroism,” of wanting to achieve a heroic self-image, that we find the
motivations for actions that often result in barbarity.

3. PRIMITIVE EVIL, MODERN EVIL: ON EVIL AS A RESPONSE TO EVIL

“The greatest cause of evil included all human motives in one giant paradox. Good and bad were
so inextricably mixed that we couldn't make them out; bad seemed to lead to good, and good
motives led to bad. The paradox is that evil comes from man's urge to heroic victory over evil.”
—Ernest Becker, Escape From Evil
Now that we can consider the misleading and paradoxical nature of evil (through the notion of
evil as “myth,” evil as existing primarily “in the eye of the beholder,” and evil as a response to
evil), and the unique and scandalous situation in which man finds himself (through Becker’s
analysis of the human condition), we can move to Escape From Evil to explore the promise and
logic of evil in human affairs. Becker begins his examination by positing that man is, above all,
an animal—and although this is a truism, it is something that we must keep in mind for the rest
of this paper. Like any other organism, “...man wants to persevere as does any animal or
primitive organism; he is driven by the same craving to consume, to convert energy, and to enjoy
continued experience” (3). We have already discussed why man is fundamentally different from
other animals (his consciousness of his uniqueness and own inevitable death), and that to silence
his fear of annihilation he has “erected cultural symbols which do not age or decay”—think back
to the “heroisms'' that allow him to stand out in either apparent or subtle ways, of how culture
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sets up the world in such a way that it can be digested and is not overwhelming, of how one can
increase one’s worth as long as one adheres to what any given culture values, and how culture
can provide individuals with meaning, security, and confidence. Or, in Becker’s unblemished
prose, culture is “... the ‘religion’ that assures in some way the perpetuation of its members. [A]ll
systematizations of culture have in the end the same goal: to raise men above nature, to assure
them that in some ways their lives count in the universe more than merely physical things count”
(4).
Becker opens his investigation by examining primitive societies—how they managed
their terror of death, how they conceived of evil, and how they were set up to successfully
eradicate death anxiety and evil, and promote life. We know that every organism seeks, above all
else, to perpetuate itself—to cause itself to continue to exist. Man, of course, is not exempt from
this rule. An important detail that is often missed but that Becker categorically highlights, is the
role that averting evil plays in this process of self-perpetuation. What stemmed from man’s
attempts at perpetuating itself and averting evil—once they managed to minimize the threat of
other hostile animal species and formed communities of people—is the invention of ritual.
Becker describes ritualistic activity as a “technique for giving life”; the point of ritual is to
control life, to make man feel that he can firmly clasp his destiny, to make him feel that he can
bend the natural world to his benefit (6). This is an idea that already foreshadowed disaster: man
sought to control the world around him, and what he arrived at was the practice and furtherance
of ritual (the fact that our "modern" rituals are severely different from those of archaic man does
not entail that we do not perform rituals; we do, the idea behind ritualistic behavior is the same,
it is the form that has changed). Naturally, this is rather difficult for us to comprehend today, but
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as Becker writes, “The fact is that primitive man imagined he could transfer life from one thing
to another, that he could, for example, take the spirit-power that resided in the scalp of an enemy
and … transfer that life from its former owner to the new one” (7). Here, the logic of the practice
is clear: to take away life from an enemy so it can be passed on to an ally. In this fashion, men
organized “invisible project[s]” that allowed them to believe they had power over life and death,
and hence were above mere “animals.” We also know that animals tend to divide themselves into
groups, and these groups often compete for prosperity. In man, this tendency is specially marked,
and for good reason. Initially, it makes sense that men sought to form groups, there are limited
resources and working by oneself to attain prosperity would prove unavailing, but that in itself
doesn’t explain the exuberant violence and blood-thirsty competitiveness that occurred between
groups (think of the Plains Indians of North America, who practiced “counting coups,” which is
essentially touching an enemy with a coup stick without causing any harm). One is tempted to
explain these violent encounters as mere fights for survival, but it is all too “dramatic” and
thoroughly organized for that to be the case. Upon further inspection, we get to understand that
men divided themselves not only because they feared each other, but because—and here is where
we see, as Becker says, the “primitive genius”—they sought to set up society as a “continuing
contest for the forcing of self-feeling” (13). What this means is that primitive societies were set
up as playgrounds for the attainment of power; their whole world revolved around outshining
their enemies and proving their superiority over them. To touch an enemy with a coup stick
without intending to do damage demonstrates power over the enemy not only because the enemy
was at the mercy of the performer, but because the life of the performer was put on the line…
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they cheated death and taunted their enemy: what other proof for towering excellence does one
need other than this?
Furthermore, at the center of rituals, we find the practice of “sacrifice” and
“scapegoating”—which, in the last analysis, reveal the essence of ritualistic activity. Becker
explains this with a stark, unusual depth: “The sacrificer goes through the motions of performing
in miniature the kind of arrangement of nature that he wants. He may use water, clay, and fire to
represent the sea, earth, and the sun … if he does things exactly as … the gods did them in the
beginning of time, then he gets control over the earth and creation” (20). By performing a
sacrifice, primitive man obtained control over earthly things—he appeased the gods and earned
their favor. The idea is to take a life to affirm ours in such a way that the gods may offer us their
approval. Scapegoating naturally enters primitive society as a way of localizing evil so it can be
rid of—there is a lot to say on this, but the general idea is that by creating a narrative that
focalizes evil, that tells us exactly where to find it, one is half-liberated from it because the next
logical step is to eliminate it. This is why ideologies that seek to purify the world and rid it from
evil generally end in atrocity—when evil is localized, what should one do but eliminate it? We
should keep in mind the importance of getting rid of evil, given that it negates life and threatens
an organism’s self-perpetuation project. From here, it is easy to see where this discussion is
heading. From rituals, sacrifices, and scapegoating practices we tried to gain the favor of the
gods through a means that was both material and vocal (rather than invisible): shamans, who
claimed to be intermediaries between the physical world and the spirit world. The tribe villagers,
naturally, sought to gain the favor of the shamans in order to attain the favor of the gods. From
there, we moved to kingships, where kings were allegedly “chosen” people and appealed to the
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public’s necessities. Becker writes, “The king represented the new fountainhead of spiritual
power in which the subjects were nourished” (67). Lastly, money entered the picture and gave
man a direct way to measure his worth—the more objects he owned, the more immortal he was.
Here, one can think of how gold (an inanimate and actively pointless object to own) can give one
continued life and satisfaction—because it is itself an indestructible metal and has a long
"religious" history. The reason why I am going through Becker’s entire historical
phenomenology (though I have only covered in detail his analysis on primitive societies) is
because one can’t understand how evil is allowed today as it was back then if one doesn’t see the
succession of events that have led to our times—and the ways we manage our immortality
projects (which are the projects aimed at creating or becoming part of something that we feel will
outlive us), and get rid of the evil of our world. Granted, all this perusal of sacrifice,
scapegoating, shamans, kingships, and money may seem disconnected from the topic of
discussion, evil, until we consider the following: How can we understand poverty (which is
arguably one of the greatest and certainly avoidable evils in the world), if we don’t understand
why money is such a sacred part of modern human life? How can we understand why the world
allows people to starve in spite of having an abundance of resources, if we are not clear on the
“religious” nature of money, and the need (even if masked) of people to inflate themselves and
indulge in possessions? How can a man buy a six-figure (or whatever figure, really) gold chain
he doesn’t need, or that expensive collectible for his growing collection, and not feel remorse for
having essentially “wasted” money that could’ve prevented someone from painfully dying of
starvation or disease? These are questions that are not meant to be taken lightly because they
point to a disheartening conclusion: that there are evils we pretend to tackle, when in truth we

37
endorse them. We may say we want equality, but in reality we want more for ourselves. We may
say we detest the filthy rich men who get to keep all the money while poor people are dying, and
yet not hesitate to buy the latest pointless fad that comes out. We may say our ideas about
morality are advanced and up to date, but the inhumanity of Hitler's Germany only a few years
ago shows the contrary. The Roman arena games made of death a spectacle; and we may think
that our civilized world is far from "organizations" of this macabre nature, but this can't be
further from the truth, and this is the meaning of George Orwell’s 1984: war and peace over and
over, without end… this is the spectacle of war, of knowing that there is a war, and that peace
(the elimination of evil) has been achieved, that all is well now, that evil has been localized and
annihilated, and when evil comes again, war may once more break out to bring the people the
luxury of feeling evil's defeat. A look at history and its pointless wars are enough to energize this
idea. The genius of Orwell was his extraordinary understanding of human nature: "War Is Peace"
is not just a paradox, it is an observation on modern human society that is of scientific caliber.
Think of the irresistible appeal of Trump: he emerges as the hero who wants to fix a
broken land, who wants to bring “greatness” to his once great country. He has localized evil—in
the immigrants, the Mexicans, the Muslims, and the media who actively distorts the truth, and
promises his people he'll fix it, that he'll vanquish the evil. How can someone who appeals so
recklessly to man's natural necessities lose? Baumeister's observation that evil is in the eye of the
beholder is correct, and it is deeper than it looks: it is those who claim to have a full view of evil
that generally wreak havoc, because once this dynamic of "good" people vs "bad" people (who
are the active perpetrators of "evil") is set, the most natural solution is to "fix" the bad people in
order to "fix" the evil, at any cost. Today, we see the settling of this very dynamic within far-right
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extremist groups, who seem to think all the problems of their country can be solved if only the
people who are allegedly damaging it are kicked out. We see it, too, within far-left extremist
groups, who are convinced all evil stems from white people and their unearned privilege, and
have demonized whites for their past oppression and current privilege—this reminds us of
Baumeister's "getting even for past wrongs." Of course, Becker enters the discussion and
illuminates any doubts: this is human nature—and this is the world, a playground of ideologies
that fight for power, because if they're right, we’re wrong, and if we’re wrong, we die.

Chapter 3—
Re-designing Nature and Re-constructing the Genome: On The Problem of
Suffering in the Technological World

“The discipline of suffering, of great suffering—know ye not that it is only this discipline that
has produced all the elevations of humanity hitherto? The tension of soul in misfortune which
communicates to it its energy, its shuddering in view of rack and ruin, its inventiveness and
bravery in undergoing, enduring, interpreting, and exploiting misfortune, and whatever depth,
mystery, disguise, spirit, artifice, or greatness has been bestowed upon the soul—has it not been
bestowed through suffering?”
—Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil
"The total amount of suffering per year in the natural world is beyond all decent contemplation.
During the minute it takes me to compose this sentence, thousands of animals are being eaten
alive; others are running for their lives, whimpering with fear; others are being slowly devoured
from within by rasping parasites; thousands of all kinds are dying of starvation, thirst and
disease."
—Richard Dawkins, River Out of Eden
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It may have inconvenienced the reader that over the course of our examination a pertinent
definition of “evil” has not been proposed. Yet, this absence of definition seems consistent with
Baumeister’s claim that evil is in the eye of the beholder (in the decidedly subjective experience
of the victim) and with Becker’s contention that the problem of evil is fundamentally the
problem of death—that is, of an individual’s confrontation with their mortality. What we call
“evil” is too elusive to afford a sensible definition: it lends itself to too many distortions and
permutations. To look at the problem full in the face is bound to generate a plethora of
inconsistencies and antinomies. Not only has the very phenomena we call “evil” changed and
mutated throughout history, but our relationship to it as well (recall here the “myth of pure evil”
and its allure, especially in the digital era, where any event can be filmed and lend itself to
manipulation, to an abundance of decontextualized interpretations and explanations).
I should clarify, however, why is it that evil is so difficult to define and what it reveals
about the nature of evil itself: it is not merely that evil is in the eye of the beholder, or that more
often than not evil is a reaction against “evil” itself, but that the very idea of evil, and the notion
that it is easily definable and identifiable—coupled with the course of its elimination—is what
perpetuates it. Risking a rather palpable contradiction, I would argue that one “knows” what evil
is, otherwise one could not have followed neither Becker nor Baumeister’s analyses. The
problem isn’t “evil,” but what disfigures it—and hence what allows us to rationalize, justify, or
overlook it. What we would ordinarily regard as evil may be distorted by our subjective and
collective experience of a given incident, as well as by our relationship to it and how it affects us.
Subjective in the sense that our propensity to victimize ourselves results in the vilification of
some agent, and since this victimization produces an unbearable feeling of vulnerability and fear
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(often in the form of hatred), it is only natural that the perceived evil will be met with either
scorn or violence. As we have already stated, man (like any other organism) seeks to perpetuate
himself, to guarantee his continuation, to attain prosperity and safety, and any thing that threatens
or stands in the way of this continuation or prosperity will be deemed “evil”—evil because it is
against me, in complex and symbolic ways. And collective in the sense that it is a symbolic
danger, a danger not only to oneself but to one’s righteous neighbor, or culture, or ideology, or
country. What all the examples of evil we have discussed here have in common, and this is likely
to be the very essence of evil, is suffering—especially pointless or unnecessary suffering, and
more so if the recipient of suffering is “innocent” (that is, thought to be absolutely undeserving
of their misery) and unable to rid themselves of their suffering.
Becker’s brilliant analysis of primitive cultures and their elaborate rituals show us that
since the beginning, man was concerned with attaining a sense of security by fending off the evil
he recognized in nature. Today, we are no longer susceptible to the accidents of nature (evidently,
we are, though not to the same extent, but in our scientifically oriented world, we feel to be in
control of nature, not at its mercy), and so the greatest evil is not posed by nature but by man
himself. I should underscore two things: that the essence of evil, as I understand it, is suffering,
and that man is the greatest threat for man. I want to be clear that by “suffering” as the essence of
evil I mean, and this is trite, that any adverse state of affairs is—broadly speaking—“evil,” just
as primitive man regarded as evil any event which brought death or regression, i.e., any event
which worked against his abiding longing for prosperity, for the satisfaction of his many
cravings, for the improvement of his lot...the prolongation of his existence. This “definition” of
evil includes, to be sure, mental suffering—which is possibly the most pervasive mode of

41
suffering today, for “mental illnesses,” these aberrations of the mind, are the hallmark of the
techno-industrial world. Here we are going to diverge from what we have discussed so far, and
we’re going to delve into the very specific problems that our highly technological world will
inevitably face in regards to “fixing” this problem of evil—i.e., the problem of suffering in the
world, both physical and psychological, and not only in humans but in non-human animals as
well. The reader may well sense that we are setting foot on the territory of ethics, that we are
now going to seriously consider questions such as: If suffering is no longer inevitable, owing to
scientific and technological development, should we set out to eliminate it? Most people seem to
care, to some extent, about animal suffering, and yet hardly flinch at the gruesome and
murderous reality of the natural world. It is only natural to ask, do we have a moral responsibility
to abolish suffering not only in humans but also in non-human animals? Is an “escape from evil”
(suffering) something we really want? With the development of biotechnology and
gene-engineering, their normalization process and ethical postulations, the question of the
irremediability of suffering will have to be revisited—with serious and wide-ranging
considerations. We will be looking at David Pearce’s raw and far-sighted “The Hedonistic
Imperative”

as well as his “Reprogramming Predators,”

to look at the problem of

suffering—the evil of suffering—from a present-day perspective and argue that the
transhumanist project of abolishing suffering both in humans and non-human animals is a serious
and practical undertaking. Furthermore, I will go so far as to say that the transhumanist project is
compatible with modern psychoanalytic theory—that the human condition is a massive problem,
that present-day society does not and cannot attend to man’s most elementary psychological
needs and thus exacerbate the problem, and that if we were to look at man soberly and without
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one’s habitual illusions, we should arrive at the conclusion that default settings do not work in a
world that isn’t in its default state, that is, the way that modern society is set up makes happiness
an unattainable goal. We are, quite literally, not wired to live the way we do today, our
configuration is primitive, but our way of living (and our physical reality) has changed
dramatically: our composition and current living conditions are not compatible.

1. THE ETHICAL POSTULATION
“On almost every future scenario, we’re destined to ‘play God’. So let’s aim to be compassionate
gods and replace the cruelty of Darwinian life with something better.”
—David Pearce

The thought makes one immediately uneasy—to eliminate that element of sentient life, that
sacred constituent...emblem of existence: suffering. The idea strikes one as ludicrous, and the
sole suggestion (or possibility) of a future without pain, neither physical nor psychological,
makes one ideate a dystopian or calamitous future in the form of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New
World: where people are drugged into bliss, but also compliance and lethargy, engage in
unrestrained sexual activity to heighten happiness and enjoyment. Huxley’s vision of a
technological society that modulates suffering by expeditiously fulfilling the immediate needs
and desires of every citizen is nightmarish and somber. It is a society with pleasure at its centre;
a society which lulls, desensitizes, and stifles their human potential and growth—what need is
there for art, intellectual development, or progress when one is constantly and unfailingly happy?
We value these aims, and a world without them seems to us tragic. Suffering is romanticized in
literature, religion, and philosophy—for it is inexorable, and to bear it courageous. What else
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would we do with suffering but elevate it and give it meaning? Suffering is a curse we have
turned into a cult, and we cannot do, it seems, with or without it. The “grind” culture of today,
which exalts work and celebrates working several jobs or working overtime for barely any pay or
reason other than amassing a few bills and feeling “productive,” is essentially a cult of suffering:
to work is to live, the toil is purpose, and any length of time that is felt to be “unproductive” (that
doesn’t contribute to one’s economic position or social capital) is deemed wasted. Suffering is
the mark of a life that is spent properly, and being unable to work is akin to dying. It should be
neither controversial nor surprising to argue that most people today look at work as a moral
obligation and sine qua non, a life that does not involve work is not worth living—one’s very
suffering is one’s trophy, one’s pain one’s reward...suffering indicates that one is doing what one
should, it is rebelling against peace and contentment, for life is about duty, not pleasure. Pain
does not produce meaning or purpose, progress does (whatever one understands progress to be),
and suffering happens to be a byproduct of progress, albeit unnecessary; yet pain, by itself, is in
no way desirable or valuable. Moreover, the trope of the “tortured artist” also contributes to our
romantic view of suffering—that “good” art is necessarily a product of angst and mental
suffering, that mental illness is a prerequisite to becoming a “true” artist...that the great poets and
painters were great because of their mental illnesses, not in spite of them. Even when painless
surgery was introduced in the mid-19th century there were reservations, as Katherine Power
notes in her essay “The End of Suffering”: “...although many welcomed anaesthesia, some did
object. In Zurich, anaesthesia was even outlawed. ‘Pain is a natural and intended curse of the
primal sin. Any attempt to do away with it must be wrong,’ claimed the Zurich City Fathers.
Painless delivery in childbirth was a particularly contentious issue. Some insisted that ‘in sorrow
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thou shalt bring forth children’ (Genesis 3:16) … There was even a belief, expressed in 1847 in
The New York Journal of Medicine, that pain was vital to surgical procedure” (Power, "The End
of Suffering"). In fact, even today this continues to be an issue, where some people encourage
mothers to opt for ‘natural” childbirth (vaginal labor and delivery with no medical intervention).
Suffering is only necessary when we begin to give it meaning and value, but if we look at it
beneath a surface level examination, the notion that it is indispensable is just as ridiculous as
claiming that “Pain is a natural and intended curse of the primal sin.”
We know, through our examination of Becker’s Escape From Evil, that man’s search for
meaning and immortality—as a result of his unwavering fear of death—leads him to create
symbols which do not decay or die, and these symbols ought to be protected (for it is these
symbols which give man meaning and security), and the cost of protection is often violence. My
point is that man’s very ambiguous condition, of being neither angel nor beast (as we have said
and elucidated in our discussion of Becker), of being conscious of his inevitable death, has made
him erect a system of values and symbols which, in spite of making life bearable and
meaningful, restrains him. If one follows from head to foot the diagnosis that Becker has
synthesized, since Becker’s project is to sew and varnish the vast psychoanalytic literature since
Freud, it is not too difficult to see that all of man’s efforts have been devoted to abolishing
suffering through the making of meaning and the erection of symbols. Needless to say, the
process has been smeared with blood, and more—not less—suffering. The problem is the
following: socio-economic reform (on its own at least), technological innovation in its current
form, the expansive array of diversions and entertainment offered by any given culture,
economic flourishing, political reformation, or any form of environment improvement will not
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eliminate the kind of suffering that is emblematic of the human animal, namely, psychological
suffering. All of these, though obviously necessary, do not make man immune to existential
dread, fear of death, sadness, disappointment, envy, anger, melancholy, and general malaise.
There are many reasons as to why lifelong “happiness” is an unachievable ideal, but we
will only consider one (aside from man’s natural search for cosmic “specialness” and fear of
death which nolens volens results in anguish and malaise), and that is his biologically determined
hedonic set-point—happiness, or more specifically our level of subjective well-being, is
primarily governed by heredity, by our biological construction. And if there is anything we have
learned about evolutionary biology is that evolution does not care about an animal’s well-being
more than it cares about its perpetuation. The transhumanist movement aims at precisely
eliminating the biological substrates of suffering—both psychological and physical, the latter of
which abounds in the natural world. It is about transcending the human body, that is to say, about
releasing man from the shackles of his natural constitution: to alter his condition (which is
acutely tragic and soon-to-be needlessly painful) rather than romantically and masochistically
accepting it. Nature is not concerned with an animal’s psychological prosperity, but with an
animal’s survival.
Indeed, technological progress is on its way to making the abolition of suffering an
immediate possibility. If one is to consider, rationally and soberly, the condition of man (without
the illusions which make it bearable) the prospect of designer drugs and genetic engineering does
not seem absurd, but rather logical—it is scarcely controversial to argue that on almost every
future, as Pearce has correctly stated, we are to play “gods” on account of pronounced
technological and scientific progress, why not be compassionate gods and spare future
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generations of the pains of biologically determined existence? Furthermore, if we are witness to
the perpetual devouring and persecution that proliferates in the natural world, a devouring and
persecution that is fundamentally unnecessary, meaningless, and cruel, why not spare non-human
animals from the excruciating agony of Darwinian life? It is, of course, understandable that one
recoils from such a proposal—to alter the natural constitution of a living organism is no
inconsequential undertaking. But the idea that we do not already alter the natural constitution of
living organisms is palpably false. Indeed, the tantalizing notion that that much control over our
composition and that of non-human animals would ultimately lead to ruin is also uninformed
thinking, since it is anodyne to argue that man already has and will have (over the course of the
next few years) even more control over the environment and his composition. One sneers at the
possibility of the use of “drugs” to hoist mood and recalibrate the hedonic set-point, as if
societies all over the world do not already indulge in a multitude of drugs and diversions to
palliate unpleasant mental states. Designer drugs would not produce the torpor and passivity of
Huxley’s “Soma,” but uplift mood and even improve brain function. Or, as Pearce put it: “...in
Brave New World, there is no depth of feeling, no ferment ideas, and no artistic creativity… [but]
even today, the idea that chemically-driven happiness must dull and pacify is demonstrably
false” (“Hedonistic"). One may contend that a world in which man depends on drugs to be
“happy” is a tragic world, for man’s happiness would not result from an acceptance of his
precarious condition, but from technological invasion, from drugs or designing of his own. Still,
people today already indulge in drugs, diversions, commodities, etc., which are arguably more
tragic. The proposal that we should abolish suffering in the natural world seems to us
sacrilegious because we are accustomed to looking at the natural world with the feeling that this
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is how things ought to be because that is the way that they naturally are. But in a Darwinian
world, as Pearce has rightly observed, “...the welfare of some beings depends on their doing
harm to others” ("Reprogramming"). Most people do not objectively grasp the reality of the
animal world, and the agony that accompanies it; one reason is our separation from it, another is
the romanticized and dramatic (as opposed to cruel and remorseless) depiction of nature that
literature and documentary films have fabricated. Nature is not serene and peaceful as popular
thought would have us believe; far from it, the brutality and sheer viciousness of the natural
world surpasses all presumptions. No one has put it as clearly and concisely as Pearce:
To get a conceptual handle on what is really going on during "predation", let's
compare our attitude to the fate of a pig or a zebra with the fate of an organism
with whom those non-human animals are functionally equivalent, both
intellectually and in their capacity to suffer, namely a human toddler. On those
rare occasions when a domestic dog kills a baby or toddler, the attack is
front-page news. The offending dog is subsequently put down. Likewise, lions in
Africa who turn man-eater are tracked down and killed, regardless of their
conserved status. This response isn't to imply lions - or for that matter rogue dogs
- are morally culpable. But by common consent they must be prevented from
killing any more human beings. By contrast, the spectacle of a lion chasing a
terrified zebra and then asphyxiating its victim can be shown on TV as evening
entertainment, edifying viewing even for children. How is this parallel relevant?
Well, if our theory of value aspires to a God's-eye perspective, stripped of
unwarranted anthropocentric bias in the manner of the physical sciences, then the
well-being of a pig or a zebra inherently matters no less than the fate of a human
baby - or any other organism endowed with an equivalent degree of sentience. If
we are morally consistent, then as we acquire God-like powers over Nature's
creatures, we should take analogous steps to secure their well-being too. Given
our anthropocentric bias, thinking of non-human vertebrates not just as equivalent
in moral status to toddlers or infants, but as though they were toddlers or infants,
is a useful exercise. Such reconceptualisation helps correct our lack of empathy
for sentient beings whose physical appearance is different from "us".
(“Reprogramming,” italics mine)
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Once viewed in this light, it is no longer preposterous to argue that abolishing the superabundant
suffering of the natural world would be a desirable goal and a moral imperative. From a classical
utilitarian perspective, and even a Buddhist perspective, the urgency of abolishing suffering in all
sentient beings is an overriding ethical concern. We are categorically desensitized by a
romanticized and dramatized narrative, abundant in literature and film, and made to view the
cruel reality of the natural world without feeling, without relatedness. There is an air of
“unreality” that the sight of predation produces: a lion chasing a terror-stricken buffalo who is
too tired to scream after being knocked down and—understanding that there is no escape—sits
silently as it is being ravaged and eaten alive by a flock of lions. Or a gang of hyenas cornering a
pregnant zebra and then proceeding to tear it apart as it shrieks in agony. We look at the spectacle
of terror and death of the natural world with amusement and levity, for us it is entertainment,
since that side of nature seems frivolous to us. From a psychoanalytic standpoint, it is only
natural that we have distanced ourselves from the reality of nature...and dramatized, disguised it.
If any of this sounds labored, recall here our discussion of the fear of death (and the illusions that
we entertain to quiet it): we caricaturize nature because really we are terrified of it. Those
animals suffer and toil as nature has intended; they are animals who rely on instinct and
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reflexes...machines who operate by rote, who can neither think nor feel as we do (if they do at
all), and who are, strictly speaking, in another compartment—how could we be part of this
vacuous and barbarous side of nature? How can the murdering of a zebra be as reprehensible as
the murdering of a man? If one were to witness the screaming and shrieking of soon-to-be torn
apart non-human animals, one would soon re-evaluate one’s understanding of nature. As Pearce
put it, “It would be a mercy if the experience of suffocation were fundamentally different in
human and non-human animals'' (''Reprogramming"). Note that so far we have focused on the
problem of predation specifically, which excludes all other ruthless behavior—think of a lion
slaughtering a lioness’s cubs so that she mates with him, a cowbird dumping her eggs into
another species’ nest to avoid wasting time and effort in childcare (and if the hosts expel the
alien eggs, it returns to demolish the entire clutch), a slave-making ant who steals and exploits
the brood of other ant species to strengthen the worker force of their colony. Examples like these
are bountiful, but we do not have time to discuss them here. Suffice it to say that the natural
world is an auditorium of murder and suffering, where merciless deception and cruelty abound,
and if we are to be morally consistent, the passive acceptance of this problem (while having the
tools to eliminate the problem) is indeed unethical by any decent measure—at least according to
the transhumanists. Now, that this is a “problem” is not entirely obvious, this is why Pearce
compares the suffering of a zebra (by suffering we mean not only physical pain, but panic, dread,
fear, etc.) to that of a human toddler; if one is capable of understanding, viscerally rather than
intellectually, one can begin to sense the urgency of the question: is not abolishing the endless
toil and suffering of the natural world, while having the tools to do so, morally justifiable?
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As Pearce notes: “Most modern city-dwellers do not lose any sleep over the cruelties of
Nature, or indeed give them more than a passing thought. Implicitly, it's assumed such suffering
doesn't matter. Or if it does matter, it doesn't matter enough to mitigate or abolish''
("Reprogramming"). There are many reasons as to why the suffering that takes place in the
natural world doesn’t seem to matter, and Pearce mentions a few. The feeling that that is the way
that things ought to be is perhaps the most obvious of reasons, and it ties back to the inevitability
of suffering. The problem, as Pearce correctly points out, is that suffering will no longer be
inevitable, and so future generations will have to necessarily deal with the prospect of its
abolishment. We have also touched on what Pearce refers to as a “television-based conception of
the living world,” which is the narrative that film and television perpetuate. This is anchored to
what Pearce refers to as “selective realism,” which is our tendency to take the “good” portrayals
of nature to define nature, while entirely ignoring the “bad” depictions. Or, as Pearce soberly
puts it:
Realistic depictions of the full nastiness of predation are taboo. As David
Attenborough once remarked to some viewers who complained that a scene
shown was too gruesome: "You ought to see what we leave on the cutting room
floor". This text hints at the horror, but words don't really portray it. And even the
most explicit video couldn't evoke the first-person reality of being dismembered,
strangled, impaled, drowned, poisoned or eaten alive. The problem of suffering in
Nature described here is worse - and its prevention more morally urgent - than we
suppose. For example, try to imagine what it's like slowly dying of thirst over
several days during the dry season. There may be no overt drama. It's just
subjectively horrific. Hence the ethical obligation on the dominant species to stop
such horrors as soon as we acquire the technical expertise to do so.
(“Reprogramming,” emphasis added)
Indeed, even with descriptions like these most of us are hardly moved, that is to say, we do not
feel for the animals in question: “Human empathetic responses are shaped by natural
selection...it's fitness-enhancing for parents to experience an empathetic response to the feelings
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of their children, but maladaptive to feel compassion for their children's "food". Selection
pressure for empathy toward members of other races or species...is weak to non-existent since
such empathy wouldn't promote our reproductive success” ("Reprogramming"). All of these,
coupled with man’s natural narcissism (that it is he, or his species, the one that really matters),
make for the body of hindrances that the transhumanist project will face when the technology
becomes available (or its production theoretically feasible), and the philosophy widespread.
To be sure, the removal of predatory behavior in the natural world will have its
reverberations, and it depends first and foremost on the method. The least appealing modus
operandi would be selective extinction, by applying “indiscriminate depot-contraception” on
carnivores we could drive predatory species to extinction quite rapidly ("Reprogramming"). Yet,
something feels wrong about steering a species to extinction, especially a species that is highly
respected or idolized—and this “respect” lies “...in our fetishizing the strong, handsome and
powerful over the gentle and vulnerable” ("Reprogramming"). Recall here Nietzsche’s assertion
that the good, in the premoral period, was that which was strong and vigorous rather than weak
and vulnerable: we fetishize the fearless, the courageous and the powerful—indeed, “...the
spectacle of large predators hunting and asphyxiating their terrified victims is more visually
compelling than herbivores browsing inoffensively. Which would you rather watch on TV?
("Reprogramming"). But more than that, we value the strong and the fearless because it is
precisely the strong and the fearless who have a higher chance of survival, and, as we have
repeatedly said, every organism strives for survival and prosperity. We value these “types” of
organisms because they are strong and apt, but “Why fetishize life-forms endowed with a
heritable tendency to prey on and strangulate others? Some monstrous life-forms are best
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banished to the archives for good” ("Reprogramming"). It might have done us proper service to
fetishize organisms with violent predispositions in ancient times, but today, having an escalating
mastery over nature and a piercing understanding of our human condition (not to mention a
towering intelligence and sensitivity), it serves us no longer to idealize the powerful and violent.
As Pearce notes: “...to judge that lions should exist is to affirm that it is better, in some sense,
that sociopathic killing machines prowl the Earth rather than alternative herbivores”
("Reprogramming"); I think that Pearce’s reasoning here is not as outrageous as it sounds, but in
order to even consider flirting or accepting the idea one has to necessarily look at the natural
world from an objective and disenchanted point of view. It should be noted that no moral
judgment is being made here: we are not saying that the lion who ravages and eats a live zebra or
the cat who torments a terrified mouse to then swallow it whole know what they are doing, we
are not saying that they are “evil” and thus deserve to be driven to extinction; rather, we are
arguing that these animals do not have an ideal or desirable composition in terms of the
suffering they produce in nature.
The alternative methods are genetic reprogramming and behavior modification, which are
less controversial. The former would involve bio-engineering predatory species so as to
eliminate violent activity, and “prey” species would also be genetically modified to lose their
“...well justified terror of predators'' ("Reprogramming"). The latter, on the other hand, would
involve electrodes anchored to the pleasure centres of predatory species: “With suitable
surveillance and computer control, whole communities of ex-predators could be discreetly
guided in the norms of non-violent behavior. No ‘inhumanity’ would be involved in the
behavioral reshaping process since at no time are the brain's pain-centres stimulated. Nor does
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the augmented animal ever experience a sense of being made to act against its will”
("Reprogramming"). Both of these options seem to me to be well-argued, and much more
“ethically sound” than the prospect of selective extinction and kin options, which involve a more
radical approach but less intrusion (since the organism will not be genetically modified or
surveilled, but simply unable to procreate). In any case, we ought to consider Pearce’s cunning
remark: “If any creature, by its very nature, causes terrible suffering, albeit unwittingly, is it
morally wrong to change that nature? If a civilised human were to come to believe s/he had been
committing acts that caused grievous pain for no good reason, then s/he would stop - and want
other moral agents to prevent the recurrence of such behavior. May we assume that the same
would be true of a lion, if the lion were morally and cognitively ‘uplifted’ so as to understand the
ramifications of what (s)he was doing? Or a house cat tormenting a mouse? Or indeed a human
sociopath?” ("Reprogramming”).

CONCLUSION
“If I wanted to give in weakly to the most utopian fantasy I know, it would be one that pictures a
world-scientific body composed of leading minds in all fields, working under an agreed general
theory of human unhappiness. They would reveal to mankind the reasons for its self-created
unhappiness and self-induced defeat; they would explain how each society is a hero system
which embodies in itself a dramatization of power and expiation; how this is at once its peculiar
beauty and its destructive demonism; how men defeat themselves by trying to bring absolute
purity and goodness into the world…Then men might struggle, even in anguish, to come to terms
with themselves and their world.”
—Ernest Becker, Escape From Evil
“The masses have never thirsted after truth. They turn aside from evidence that is not to their
taste, preferring to deify error, if error seduce them. Whoever can supply them with illusions is
easily their master; whoever attempts to destroy their illusions is always their victim. An
individual in a crowd is a grain of sand amid other grains of sand, which the wind stirs up at
will.”
—Gustave Le Bon
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How does one conclude a discussion about evil? The reader may have observed that the question
of evil is approached by different thinkers via fundamentally different routes, leaning on
disparate methods, and asking distinct questions—the basis and intention of each inquiry differ.
Nietzsche’s On The Genealogy of Morality shows us that the region of violence is language, that
violence begins with language. This is Nietzsche’s categorical contribution to the study of evil:
that “evil” belongs to the domain of language (in defining “evil,” contrasting “evil,” and
developing a dialect to talk about “evil”). Furthermore, Nietzsche’s understanding of the role of
guilt, and what one does to avoid feelings of guilt (for guilt is not merely a reflex of remorse, but
an active endurance: guilt is a condition, produced by the feeling that one owes one’s life to one’s
nation, society, family, etc.) is imperative to understanding “evil.” Nietzsche also understood the
significance of the perverse enjoyment we derive from seeing others suffer, and a Beckerian
reading of his genealogy of punishment clarifies why this is so. Becker, in The Denial of Death
and Escape From Evil, identifies the source of “evil” not in the ways that we talk about it, but in
its function. Becker addresses the question of “evil” by looking at man’s obsession with heroism,
by diving into the logic of human hate and barbarity...and by exploring how existential anxiety,
fear, insecurity, self-esteem, and the terror of death are the engines of violence. Similarly,
Baumeister approaches the question through the mechanics of evil and the relativity of its
perception, tackling head-on the notion that evil is obvious by delineating the involuted
dynamics between “victims'' and “perpetrators.” Pearce engages in the question from an ethical
standpoint, where “evil” is essentially “suffering,” and maintains that human suffering ought to
be abolished through germline engineering and designer drugs, while non-human animal
suffering ought to be eliminated through ecosystem designing.
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In the introduction to The Denial of Death (which prefaces Escape From Evil), Becker
does not shrink away from informing the reader that the book does not contain a panacea to the
problems and evils of the world. He is not intent on “solving” the world's ills and providing the
reader with a sense of optimism by laying out a solution to the problem of the human condition
or the problem of evil; rather, it is hope that one can hope for. As Becker dejectedly writes, “For
twenty-five hundred years we have hoped and believed that if mankind could reveal itself to
itself, could come to know its own cherished motives, then somehow it would tilt the balance of
things in its own favor” (8). In the final analysis, “evil” operates as an ouroboros; it is cyclical in
that its [heroic] elimination, time and again, results in more “evil.” It is ideology against
ideology, religion (whether secular or sectarian) against religion, and it seems like we cannot do
without fetishizing evil, without pointing at the other and diabolizing him (in the subtle, intricate
ways we do). The biggest problem (or rather challenge) with minimizing evil in the world is that
its execution does not feel any different from the execution of the “good”: one can do cruel,
inhuman things, while feeling—all things considered—one is undoubtedly doing “good.” One of
course says, they (evildoers) don’t know any better and that’s why they are convinced they are
doing “good.” This collective belief is precisely what produces the most horror, as history has
repeatedly shown.
This tendency to be suspicious, to demonize, to hate or diminish in some shape or form
the other is embedded in our composition. Existential anxiety, and the many psychological needs
(needs that are overriding and unconscious) that stem from this anxiety, are installed in our
psyche. For this reason, Pearce’s sober and almost tragic solution to the problem of unhappiness
and suffering does not strike me as unwarranted. It is a hitherto impossible solution to the
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impossible condition of man. It is a solution that I imagine will call forth serious and far-reaching
discourse, but it is discourse that cannot be taken seriously without looking at our ill-starred
situation in nature from a detached standpoint. Moreover, as we have said earlier, we are
enamored of suffering, and our cult-like predilection for pain—claiming that through suffering
and pain there is always growth and possibility for meaning—renders the prospect of abolishing
suffering improbable.
Reading Nietzsche alongside Becker reveals how the language of evil and the lust for
power irrevocably prescribe our understanding of “evil.” Unlike Becker, Baumeister shows us
the relativity of evil, elucidating the dynamics of “victim” and “perpetrator,” hence making
Becker’s idea that evil is generally a response to evil much clearer and immediate. And, as I have
already remarked, Pearce’s proposal of abolishing both human and non-human suffering cannot
be soberly apprehended if one does not have an adequate understanding of the impossibility of
our situation in nature: Becker lays the groundwork necessary to consider Pearce’s ideas. After
grappling with Nietzsche, Baumeister, Becker, and Pearce, I am moved to ask, somewhat
optimistically: Is it possible to fundamentally reform our human nature without following
Pearce’s recipe? Can we transcend our condition, as Becker hopes, by knowing and
understanding our cherished motives? Or are we bound to our “fixed” condition and the
inexorable products thereof? Is a revolution in the human mind—a revolution in
consciousness—that admits that much of our suffering is caused by our inexhaustible longing for
security, by our helpless narcissism, by our strangulating fear, possible?
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